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Abstract 
The aim of this article is designed to provide an overview of the historical and contemporary 
relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as to examine the recent geopolitical situation 
and the perception of local people in Ethiopia. This paper is mainly based on secondary data 
analysis of the available secondary information and news reports, online articles, academic 
literature, interviews and discussions. The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea brought political, 
economic and social security threats to the Horn of Africa. Although the economy in Ethiopia 
is at the developing stage, recent protests have shaken the country to its core. Since 2015, 
anti-government protests have been triggered over freedom of the press, land rights, under-
represented seats in the coalition parties, and horizontal inequality in economic, political and 
social affairs among ethnic groups across the country. In this study, it is established that the 
unrestrained political circumstance of the current regime has created dissension and violence 
among the public, and thus led to escalating political, economic and security crises in the 
country. If this issue is not rectified quickly, the peace in the country may be jeopardised. 
Another issue is that although Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement is appreciated, the agreement 
between the two leaders and their foreign policy orientation is still unclear. 







Guerrilla movement, friendship and peace statement 
Ethiopia and Eritrea are located in the East African region known as the Horn of Africa. The 
Horn of Africa is composed of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South 
Sudan, and Uganda. Eritrea is bordered to the south by Ethiopia, Djibouti to the east, Sudan 
to the west and to the northeast and east by the Red Sea coastline. Eritrea shares a wider 
border with Ethiopia. Historically, various parts of Eritrea were ruled by indigenous and 
foreign powers including the British, Egyptians, Italians and Ottomans.1 
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1969 increased the presence of Italians in the horn 
of Africa. Eritrea was officially recognised as an Italian colony through the Wuchale (Uccialli) 
Treaty and the Addis Ababa Treaty at the time of Emperor Menelik II in May 1889. In 1941, 
the British occupied Eritrea. In 1950, the United Nations (U.N.) played a critical rolein 
bestowing Eritreans the right to self-determination by providing a choice for independence, 
separation, or supported union with Ethiopia and endorsed Eritrea to become a federation 
with Ethiopia.2Thus, in 1962, Emperor Haile Selassie officially ceased the federation and 
annexed Eritrea to be the 14thprovince of Ethiopia.1 
After 30 years, the Ethiopian Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the 
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), now the ruling Eritrean Party, fought side by side 
in the same year, overthrowing the Ethiopian Mengistu regime.3Eritreans finally became 
independent and established their own country in 1993.4In Julyof 1993, which is after the 
Eritrean independence referendum, the two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation. Accordingly, Ethiopia enjoys Assab port duty-free and Eritreans treated equally 
as Ethiopian citizens within Ethiopia.5The two leading insurgent groups, the TPLF and the 
EPLF, that now govern in Addis Ababa and Asmara respectively, were primarily 
opportunistic and tactical friends.6 
Ethiopia and Eritrea were separated peacefully but they ignored the clear border 
demarcation.7For over a century during the Ethiopian Empire and the Italian colonial period, 
the two countries continued to use the ambiguous borders.8The borders of the two sides were 
not clearly divided.9The small scale clashes between the Ethiopian and Eritrean police patrols 
near Badme triggered war and such minor incidents brought much more serious actions.10In 
early 1998, the border dispute tension increased and the two countries broke diplomatic 
relations. From May 1998 to June 2000, the ambiguous border led to a dispute between the 





misunderstanding, such as the commencement of an independent Eritrean currency, Nakfa in 
1997, the illegal trade involvement of Eritreans, which led to a bitter antagonism are among 
other reasons for the war break.5The border war that erupted between the two countries cost 
both countries billions of US dollars in Agriculture and infrastructure damage, lost civilians, 
and investment opportunities. Simultaneously, the trade between them and the aviation 
services of the two countries were also stopped. 
Both parties signed an Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities. To end a violent 
conflict between them, a comprehensive peace accord, the ‘Algiers Peace Agreement’ was 
signed in Algiers on the 12th of December 2000. The continuation of active hostilities 
between both parties was averted due to the peace agreement. However, in terms of ushering 
a lasting peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the peace agreement has remained ineffective 
and could not hamper the unfolding war. Moreover, the peace agreement prevailed in the de 
facto ‘no war no peace’ situation, which is no less harmful than an active hostility.5 After 
suffering a very large number of casualties and spending millions of dollars on the war, the 
final boundary decision has only changed a very small area.4 
According to scholars, even as Eritrea acknowledged a town called Badme prior to 
May 1998, it was under Ethiopian administration. 11  However, Eritrea occupied all the 
controversial land (Badme) and entered the hinterland of Ethiopia.12 In 2002, the Ethiopian-
Eritrean Boundary Commission (EEBC), approved by the United Nations Security Council, 
decided that Badme, the main town in the northern core of the war conflict, was to be placed 
under Eritrea.13Although the peace agreement was endorsed and the EEBC took its final 
decision, both countries could not escape from the no war no peace policy andthey used all 
means at their disposal to hamper the normalisation of relations.  
However, as of June 2018, the new Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali (PhD) 
(Henceforth Abiy) fully accepted the peace agreement and it seems the two nations are re-
approached. The question is whether their allies are firm or tactical and whether the 
reconciliation is analysed or just a hasty move still not known. Although Abiy 
unconditionally accepted the Algiers agreement and his administration claims it is for good, 
many people ask whether this decision is based on established conditions and 
institutionalised. 
The dispute over the border of Ethio-Eritrea is over a decade old. Abiy took office in 
April 2018 and is committed to easing tensions with Eritrea and working with the Eritrean 





Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has not expressed his views on this matter, the move by the 
Ethiopian prime minister was somewhat unexpected. Nevertheless, whether there is a 
majority of public support from the two nations to Abiy’s move is still in question. This study 
discovered from discussions and interviews with Ethiopian scholars that several Eritreans, 
even those who are against with the present autocratic regime - President Isaias, still see 
Ethiopia as a potential menace to Eritrea, not to mention the concern and complaints of many 
Ethiopians at the border and its proximity as well as the majority of Tigray people towards 
Aby’s action.14 
In early June of 2019, the Executive Committee of the long-ruling party, the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), issued a statement saying that 
Ethiopia will fully accept and implement the Algiers Agreement signed with Eritrea and 
immediately withdraw its troops from Badme and leave from the hinterland of Eritrea.15 The 
relationship between the two countries has been further improved. According to observers, 
unlike his predecessors, Abiy seemed committed to fulfilling his inaugural pledge in his first 
year. Woldemariam noted, ‘PM Abiy has a more formidable political base than his 
predecessor’.16 
According to Asmara News on the 8th of July 2018, Abiy stated in the Eritrean capital 
of Asmara that Ethiopia and Eritrea have agreed to resume aviation services, open embassies, 
and Eritrea allows Ethiopia, a landlocked country, to use the Eritrean port facilities for 
foreign trade.4 It is widely believed that the decision to resume aviation services and port use 
and the reopening of embassies and resending diplomatic missions in each other’s country 
will play a critical role in boosting the overall economic and political relationship and the 
trade of both countries as well as the Horn of Africa. However, as yet there is no apparent 
statement made on the re-establishment of diplomatic, economic, social, and trade ties 
between the two governments. 
According to Reuters on the 11th of September 2018, both leaders visited their shared 
boarders and celebrated the Ethiopian New Year together. Furthermore, this media listed on 
its website that on the 9th of July 2018, both countries signed a friendship and joint peace 
statement in Asmara, declaring the end of hostilities between them and normalising relations. 
This agreement assumed to promote national unity and regional stability and reshape the 





Ethiopia’s political appearances 
Since 2015, Ethiopia has been encountering rising vibrant political protests. Although there 
were various protests in the country, this time, the political atmosphere of Ethiopia suddenly 
changed into that of turmoil. Growing public dissatisfaction brings unprecedented Amhara, 
Gambella and Oromo protests.17 According to Záhořík noted among the major causes of the 
destabilisation of the political and economic atmosphere in Ethiopia, high internal 
displacement in several regions, social inequality, regional discrepancies, the expansion of 
Addis Ababa to the nearby region, and ethnic-based politics can be mentioned.18Thus, the 
frequencies of protests were increasingly posing risks to Ethiopia’s economic sustainability 
and the ruling government’s dream of long-term stability. Nearly every day comes news of a 
clash between security services and protesters as well as internal displacement due to inter-
communal conflict which often results in casualties. 
Consequently, the ruling government decided to impose and declare a State of 
Emergency (SoE)19 twice. On the 9th of October 2016, the first SoE was declared for six 
months, and the second SoE was immediately proclaimed one day after the unexpected 
resignation of the former Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, on the 15th of 
February 2018, and lasted three months.20Until the day this SoE was lifted, Ethiopia followed 
the ‘command post’.21 
Clearly, the relevant state organs have the right to decide and declare the 
implementation of the SoE in certain areas or in the whole country for a temporary period 
depending on the situation. However, in the case of Ethiopia, many people ask whether the 
SoE was necessary. Several opposition figures and rights groups believe that the declaration 
was just a protection for the long-ruling party, the EPRDF, arising from the aggression of the 
national revolutions, to quell multiple anti-government protests, to halt freedom of the press 
and speech and to establish an expediential environment for jailing dozens of innocent people, 
activists, journalists and members of coalition and opposition political parties.22 
Several news reports and the Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia on the 9th of 
March2018 claimed that many innocent civilians and peaceful protesters were killed and 
thousands imprisoned during the SoE.22 Correspondingly, the situation also led to the death 
of over 700 innocent citizens and imprisonment of thousands of locals, journalists, and 
individuals in opposition figures as well as a few of the coalition party members.23 Although 
the country is an influential member of both the UN Security Council and the UN Human 





civilians, journalists, activists, religious fathers, and officials regardless of their immunity as 
members of the regional administrative council.22 
This study finds out that declaring the SoE impacted the country negatively with 
respect to various aspects including trade, tourism and investment incomes. Some investors in 
and around Addis Ababa marked that although national and international guarantee were 
noted in Ethiopia’s investment proclamation, potential investors perceived that the current 
political situation of the country was unstable and economically unsuitable to invest their 
capital. Some of them are even downsizing their investment and leaving the country due to 
unstable political situations. Moreover, due to the declaration of subsequent SoEs, Ethiopia 
lost several investors as well as international aid. Similarly, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and many diplomats felt threatened. Several foreign-owned business projects were 
attacked by the aggressive protesters. For instance, Shandong Dong, the first donkey abattoir 
company in the country, Dangote Cement Plc in the Oromia region and Karuturi Global Agro 
Products Plc in the Gambella region are among the victims.24The imposed SoE tarnished 
Ethiopia’s image as one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies. 
Furthermore, the declaration of SoE also shades the diplomatic activity and security. 
As Addis Ababa is the seat of hundreds of embassies, diplomat offices, headquarters, and 
export-oriented foreign-owned organisation offices,25 the decree of SoE in Ethiopia severely 
affects their daily activities. For instance, ‘Internet has been blocked, prohibited to use social 
media, freedom of press seized, prohibited to watch and listen to satellite television and 
radios, diplomats are not allowed to travel 40 kilometres outside the capital, Addis Ababa, 
without official permission, and others’. 26  Consequently, those who transgress the new 
measure of the SoE also ‘risks jail for three to five years’.26 
Incidentally, Ethiopia’s political crisis was not just about elites scrambling for a larger 
piece of the pie but also about the lack of power and economic dispensation between 
coalitions of four ethnic parties. To illustrate, ‘The EPRDF is a coalition of four ethnic parties 
(from the main regions: Oromia, Amhara, Tigray, and SNNPR) dominated by Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)’.27 According to certain studies, 
‘The largest – the Oromo – are officially 34.5% of the population. They are followed by the 
Amhara (26.9%) and Somali (6.2%). The Tigray people are the fourth largest minority, with 
just 6.1% of the population’.28In 1989, although the TPLF/EPRDF formed a coalition of 
ethnically-based organizations, to give Ethiopia a wide political scope and legitimacy, in 





Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and Somali regions are politically administered by EPRDF’s 
sister parties and have not much political power as the coalition of four ethnic 
parties.30Furthermore, all four coalitions are supposed to be equally represented in the ranks 
of the party leadership but in reality, TPLF dominates all.28 Besides, these four coalitions 
claim to represent their ethnic communities, but except TPLF that steered the EPRDF other 
three coalitions, especially, the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (OPDO) and the 
Southern Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Front (SEPDF),have been considered as ‘weak and 
subservient components of the EPRDF’.31 
Accordingly, the sour relationship among the EPRDF members as well as sister 
parties lies in disproportionate and horizontal inequality in economic, political and social 
matters, which is the most dangerous issue for the country.18 Several studies in the conflict 
literature argue that internal political instability in many countries has been led by economic 
inequality, disproportionate shares of public resources and political powers, political 
oppression, poverty instability, and hegemony.32As political analysts argue, the ruling party 
was largely made up of minority Tigrayans, which is the northernmost of the nine ethnically-
based regions in the country.33 Similarly, according to the scholars’ perceptions and as ofthe 
16th of January 2017, the Addis Standard posted on its blog that the civilians’ anger was 
intensified because of corruption in the political system and disproportionate benefits of the 
country’s economy that has gone primarily to a minority ethnic group, Tigray, compared to 
other regions.34 
Accordingly, the state of forcible subjugation, land-grabbing approaches, unfair 
economic shares between ethnic groups, and under-represented seats in the coalition parties 
in the country’s corridor of power triggered the protesters into aggression and brought 
unprecedented anti-government squawking and rebellions across Ethiopia’s two largest 
ethnic groups (Amhara and Oromo).This study examined the reasons and based on sources 
from several local societies that the anti-government squawking was because the Amhara and 
Oromo parties in the EPRDF demanded the end of TPLF’s 21 years dominance in economic 
and political systems.35 
Following restless and flared anti-government protests, releasing the political 
prisoners and state prosecutors were initiated by the EPRDF party in its 'deep reform' at the 
time of Desalegn. To 'widen democratic space' Desalegn had announced plans to drop 
charges against political prisoners and state prosecutors. However, by the time it was unclear 





EPRDF to give vague statements and broken promises, especially on the human rights issue, 
open political space, political prisoners, election, and state prosecutors since toppling the 
Derg dictatorship in 1991.37 
Since the fall of the Derg in 1991, the TPLF as leader and organiser of the EPRDF 
has dominated Ethiopian politics. 38 Still after over 20 years on power, irrespective of its 
ostensible claim that it is under the umbrella of the EPRDF, people of the same origin 
monopolistically have held the position of advantage. Likewise, the whole country had been 
cash cowed by one specific racial group, the TPLF, while the majority is being treated as 
impediments. The work of McCracken offers some thoughtful insights and explicitly 
mentions, 'the TPLF is secretly attempting to loot Ethiopia'.39He added, ‘the TPLF/EPRDF 
has diverted large quantities of government resources and international aid to Tigray’.40Thus, 
the minorities Tigreans are beneficiaries through economic, social and political means since 
TPLF took control of both the regional and national governments.41 One of the reasons, 
according to scholars, is the establishment of the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of 
Tigray (EFFORT), which has flooded Tigray with industries.30 EFFORT is a reliable source 
of economic, social and political profit company to the region,41 which no government organs 
have obtained the right to audit so far. 42 Generally, the TPLF dominated the EPRDF’s 
despotic nature based on divide and rule.43Intelligibly, when political and economic power is 
unequally held, human capital accumulation is likely to be suboptimal since groups cannot 
make credible, long-term commitments to the elites. 
Since Abiy, one of the youngest leaders in Africa, became a prime minister, he has 
launched a wide programme of social integrity, economic and political reforms and carried 
out an astonishing turnaround in a manner completely different from that of former prime 
ministers,23 at least in the first half-year of his office.23 
In the first few months, Abiy delivered a powerful inaugural speech in those cities 
where the protests were fiercer. He apologised for the killings of peaceful demonstrators that 
happened before he came to power and preached unity and ‘Ethiopianism,’ which has never 
been adopted by the Ethiopian government in modern times. The prime minister also stunned 
Ethiopians describing the measures he would implement regarding the economic privatisation 
of sizeable state-owned enterprises, the peace deal with Eritrea, discussing the Grand 
Renaissance Dam Project with Egypt’s government and addressing various political 





Generally speaking, in his first half-year in power, he lifted the SoE, made a peace 
deal with Eritrea and initiated an earnest and honest dialogue with opposition parties. 44 
Moreover, by intensifying Desalegn’s initiative Abiy accelerated the release of many 
conscious politicians and journalists who had been languishing in prison cells across the 
country for more than six years.45Notably, some of the journalists, politicians and individual 
prisoners who were arrested by the ruling party and denounced as terrorists have been 
released recently.45 Among them were Andualem Arage, the Vice President and Press 
Secretary of Unity for Democracy and Justice Party, and Eskinidr Nega, a prominent 
journalist, who had been jailed and were sentenced to life on terrorism charges since 2011. 
Similarly, among several hundred opposition parties that have been released under 
Desalegn’s regime, Bekele Gerba, the vice head of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), 
and Professor Merera Gudina, scholar and politician (chairman of the OFC) can be mentioned. 
Would Abiy continue in the path of change in Ethiopia? Will he keep the promises 
which he made in his inaugural? Can he resist the internal political and ideological conflict 
among the four coalition parties? Can his administration curb the current religious, economic, 
and political instability in the country that is mostly initiated by the Oromo extremist? What 
would be the upshot of establishing an ally with Eritrea? Had it been examined whether 
Ethiopians and Eritreans are happy about the unclear relations and secret agreements between 
the two leaders? Had his administration realised when establishing an ally with Eritrea that it 
would affect Djibouti’s economy on the bases of port income? Clearly, Ethiopia is a stable 
port customer with Djibouti. 
 
The Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement 
The diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea is arguably very complicated and 
problematic but important for the source of regional political, economic and social stability in 
the Horn of Africa.5 Eritrea has had volatile, violent, confrontational, problematic and hostile 
relations both in neighbouring countries and international arenas.46 Eritrea's confrontation and 
conflict with Ethiopia, Sudan and Djibouti can be mentioned in the neighbouring countries. 
The reasons might be territorial, political and economic conflicts. 
The elevation of the tactical and opportunistic relations between TPLF and EPLF 





Eritreans and TPLF struggles for Tigrayans’ independence from Ethiopia, ‘but later [TPLF] 
framed its war in the wider contexts of democratic Ethiopia’.48 
In April 1993, Eritreans voted overwhelmingly for independence and the 
TPLF/EPRDF welcomed Eritrean independence sympathetically.7 Subsequently, for several 
years Meles Zenawi and Afeworki, the cousins,7 'seemed to be prepared to put past conflicts 
behind them and cooperate on a broad range of economic and diplomatic issues'.49 However, 
after the bloody war over border boundaries started their bilateral relations had degenerated 
and characterised by a no war no peace condition. Subsequently, each side has hosted and 
supported opposition parties and rebel movements. For instance, Asmara provided support to 
the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) while 
Addis Ababa provided material support to the Eritrea opposition parties. 50 
But then a year before his unexpected resignation Desalegn brings the idea of 
diplomatic relations. Woldemariam offers some thoughtful insights and articulated that 
although Desalegn shows a signal to shift the country's diplomatic relations with Eritrea by 
developing a 'new policy' in order to create a 'sustainable peace', his goal was judged as to 
'further isolating Eritrea'.51 However, after Abiy came to office although there were many 
unclear issues, the relations with Eritrea commenced. After three days of fully accepting and 
implementing the Algiers Agreement, Abiy made a historical visit to Eritrea on the8th of July 
2018.Error! Bookmark not defined.It was a major event attracting more attention at the 
national and international levels. Similarly, the issues between them have been alarming to 
the neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, the return of peace, which has brought the two 
countries to work together, allowed them to declare an end to their war and acknowledge the 
Algiers agreement.52This will indeed make a significant improvement to the social, cultural, 
political and economic relationships in the Horn of Africa.53Nevertheless, the deep-rooted 
mistrust between Ethiopia and Eritrea escorted confusion on what kind of foreign policy 
orientation they have towards each other and as many believe, this issue is now shelved but 
not yet resolved. 
At the time of his visit to Eritrea, Abiy stressed that the controversy over the border 
dispute had led to the collapse of both countries. The effects of the war were drastic for the 
entire region and led to several thousands of civilian displacements and it is estimated that 
over 100 000 people were killed.54It is widely believed that the beginning of reconciliation 
will bring forth greater opportunities for both countries. The two leaders signed a 





further strengthen their trade and economic ties. Ethiopia and Eritrea are engaged in 
reconciliation, after two decades in solitary confinement and both nations have been 
embarking on a series of activities to establish long-term relationships ranging from 
telephone calls to the restarting of Ethiopian flights to Eritrea. 
The Horn of Africa has been the subject of a significant wave of regional war for long 
and the Ethio-Eritrean war was among them. However, the recent peace and reconciliation of 
the two countries have presented new hope and has been appreciated by several scholars and 
leaders of the world.55 Particularly, the Ethio-Eritrean war broke out regarding the border 
dispute concerning Badme. According to Aljazeera’s Awol K. Allo, the cost of the war that 
entailed military resources for both countries was in several billion US dollars. Moreover, the 
war had devastating effects on natural resources, agricultural products, the ecosystem, and 
investment attractions which negatively affected the social, political and economic activities 
on both sides.56 
Before the war, the two countries’ bilateral trade agreements had enabled them to join 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and both countries are the 
member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Accordingly, 
both countries were involved in each other’s trade and assistance but after the war broke out, 
there was an upheaval and the crisis had been rising since then. Although trade exchange 
between them continued after the war broke out, it used to take place via a third party and 
commodities were extremely expensive for both countries. 
Nevertheless, after the recent peace agreement, it is believed that there will be 
economic growth and trade development, diplomatic ties, people-to-people and government-
to-government relations will be strengthened in the Horn of Africa. Consequently, the 
situation will increase investment inflow and job opportunities, enhance business and capital 
goods, improve technology transfer and human resources, raise diaspora inflow and minimise 
refugee outflow. While the nature of the trade agreement between the two countries is not 
known at the moment, it is possible to predict that both countries’ economic and trade 
connections will deepen and strengthen. 
For over two decades, peace and reconciliation between the two countries were not 
easy to achieve, and the realisation of the Algiers Agreement had been a major issue. 
Although the border demarcation and no war no peace condition had been a puzzle over a 






Security and economic challenges 
The political system in Ethiopia has undergone significant changes since 2015. It is 
remembered that the country was in great danger of collapse and disintegration. It was said 
that the ruling party had been composed of four national organisations, but in practice, TPLF 
had the strongest influence over others and held several high political positions.  
According to many people, Abiy was the first emerging leader of the Oromo ethnic 
group. Suspicions among members of the party have become more and more apparent, and 
rumours are swirling that the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) is taking over the higher 
political authorities as TPLF did before. It seems this time is for the Oromo ethnic group. 
The upcoming national elections may play a significant role in mobilising the 
necessary public support for the changes and reforms that Abiy has proposed, but it is 
unlikely that a successful election will take place without a consensus among the coalition 
parties, between opposition parties and a peaceful environment in the country. This is 
because in Ethiopian politics, especially since the EPRDF took power, elections have been 
controversial.58 In light of these developments and other reasons discussed in this study, the 
upcoming national election is a perception that might convey instabilities, which may 
threaten the peace in the country. Would Abiy's administration resolve ethnic tensions and 
conflicts and bring a peaceful environment before the planned election? It is difficult to 
answer the question of whether the national elections will take place at the scheduled time. 
Economic crisis 
While Ethiopia can still be at the forefront of GDP from Africa, growth slipped to 8%in 2018 
and 2019. Despite the government’s tendency to shrink the government-led economic model, 
the country continued to look at European and Western countries for credit and technical 
assistance, as well as at China’s financial, technical assistance, and additional investment. 
Along with this, the government has begun to transition to the private sector’s 
economic management system and is planning to privatise the telecom and logistics sector in 
the first round. The government says it will do the work in different phases, and the first plan 
is said to be prioritising the improvement of the legal framework and job creation. 






By taking lessons from the role of youth (Qeerros and Fano),59 who had taken over 
the past political system through anti-government protests, Abay said his administration is 
focusing its efforts on employment-generating projects and developing major cities. This is 
taken as a reference to the recent Financial Times newspaper saying that if we can change 
Addis Ababa, we can change Ethiopia.60 However, in order to reduce the income inequality 
prevailing in Ethiopia and to promote sustainable development, the change must start from 
the rural areas of the country where 80% of the population are engaged in agriculture and 
agriculture is the foundation of the country's economy.24Besides, concerning employment-
generating projects, there is no single project that has been commenced since Abiy has come 
to power. This is a headache to Abiy and his administration. 
Although Abiy has done many reforms, the continuation of these reforms is still in 
question, while the paths to success are vague and narrow. Thus, his administration should 
strive to create a democratic and stable political system centred on diversity in his second 
year of power. It is expected that his administration has to work along with the coalition to 
have a common vision by restructuring and strengthening the EPRDF or the recent 
'Prosperity Party,' so that Abiy’s reform journey will be successful. It is also an assignment 
that is expected from his administration to rectify the economic crisis by designing a clear 
and strong economic road map. 
Above all, Abiy and his administration are expected to face serious criticism for the 
deteriorating of the economic, social and security situations. Furthermore, Abiy is expected to 
acknowledge that the challenges facing the country are beyond the power of one leader and 
this will enable the country to use the assistance of skilled countries. Many participants in the 
discussion believe that Abiy and his administration could not handle the Oromo ethnic 
nationalists, extremists and the OLF by providing the reason that the army of OLF still did 
not disarm.14 The participants in the discussion ask a question to claim their observation is 
accurate, where were Abiy and his administration when several banks were robbed in 
Oromiaregional state?14 On top of the political instability in the country burglarizing private 
and governmental properties,(discussed below)is a total economic disaster. 
Security crisis 
Last year alone, more than three million people were displaced by ethnic violence, making 
Ethiopia one of the most internally displaced countries in the world, and conflicts between 





the Gedeo southern region of Ethiopia, where more than one million people have been 
displaced, in addition to the destruction of many people’s property. Moreover, according to 
several observers Amhara people have been displaced, killed and harassed from all corners of 
the country. 
It is difficult to deny that Abiy’s actions against the senior leadership and national 
security officials on the one hand have created significant public spillovers and, on the other, 
increased security vulnerability. In addition to this, it is said that the TPLF and some of the 
Tigray people feel a great sense of isolation and violence, especially on the agreement that 
Abiy made with Afeworki which provoked anger. Tigray region, the northern part of Ethiopia, 
is one of the regions in the country that straddles the border with Eritrea. Thus, the fear of 
eruption of war between Tigray and Eritrea is in the mind of many. According to scholars 
initially, the TPLF, which is currently ruling the Tigray region, had the intention of 
expanding the Tigray borders in Ethiopia so as to establish the 'Republic of Greater Tigray' 
according to the 1976 manifesto.62This may be among the reasons that most of the TPLF and 
Tigrayansdo not agree with Abiy unconditionally accepting an agreement with Eritrea. 
By contrast, the prime minister has been involved in setting up several committees, 
including National Reconciliation Commissions and Ministry of Peace to handle regional, 
group or ethnical problems. In order to solve the attendant problems once and for all, the 
government must strengthen institutions beyond the temporary solution, and especially in 
establishing the newly established Ministry of Peace to work towards an inclusive national 
reconciliation in the community. Abiy's assertion on the establishment of a border and 
identity commission was fiercely opposed by some politicians, extremists, scholars, observers, 
and even a civil society group. 
The ownership of Addis Ababa is currently another headache that Abiy is facing, 
which the Oromo extremists advocate. Accordingly, the Oromo ethnic nationalists and some 
of the ODP members claim that Ethiopia’s capital is a part of the Oromia regional state. This 
issue escorts an ideal conflict and separation among the coalition parties mainly the Amhara 
Democratic Party (ADP) and ODP and causes the emergency of Addis Ababa City Advocacy 
group named ‘Baladera Council,’ where Eskender Nega is the leader. 
Incidentally, it is revealed that Orthodox followers and Orthodox churches in the 
Oromia and Somali regional states are being attacked by ethnic extremists. Since 2015 as 
several local people mention more than 10 Orthodox churches and several mosques have 





burned in the eastern and western Hararge of the Oromia regional state, and the Orthodox 
followers and church fathers were known to have led to death, persecution, beatings, and 
forced conversion. Thus, political, economic, social, and cultural security even freedom of 
religion in Ethiopia is at a greater risk. 
Analysis and discussion 
This study analysed that the hope of the Ethiopian political renaissance is in danger because 
of the power struggle among the Oromo political elites, ethnic nationalists, extremists, and 
ethnical based political systems. These situations led to internal displacements, ethnic 
conflicts, social, political and economic instability in the country. The unreliable relations 
among members of the coalition party, a mass killing tragedy that happened on the high 
delegates of Amhara regional state and the non-cooperative movement of TPLF to Abiy’s 
administration are additional issues for the current situation in the country. Furthermore, the 
action of the extremists and ethnic nationalists group has been shrouded Abiy’s 
administration in criticism. 
The Amhara and Oromo people revolution attempted to infiltrate the ruling party, the 
EPRDF, which was formerly dominated by the TPLF for decades.63Furthermore, the Oromo 
Democratic Party(ODP), formerly known as the Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organisation 
(OPDO), has been able to create a quick understanding and did not hesitate to cooperate with 
the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the predecessor to the current Amhara 
Democratic Party (ADP), the Oromo political elites, ethnic nationalists as well as the 
extremist groups. The reason is that the Oromo political elites and the extremist groups have 
the ability to make propaganda and organise the youth in the region and the ADP also has the 
ability to cooperate on ditching the dominance of TPLF. Following which, Abiy, who was the 
deputy chairman of the ODP, came to power.Error! Bookmark not defined. The 
domination of the TPLF in the ruling party has now minimised and the ODP has seized the 
opportunity to expand the power structure as had been practiced by TPLF and according to 
the political observers, ADP seems tactically and systematically pushed out by ODP and the 
Oromo extremists and ethnical nationalists. 
As of the 13th of January 2019, the Aigaforum marked on its website that since Abiy 
came to power, the Oromo political elites struggle was underway to control power in the 
region as well as in the country. Accordingly, the ODP has entered the new political arena 





elites, and the extremist groups with the political agenda. Several of the Oromo political 
parties also did not escape the critics of the extremist group. This problem brings a threat to 
the federal government, led by Abiy, who is now the chairman of the ODP and the chairman 
of the EPRDF,Error! Bookmark not defined. for that, he has double responsibilities for the 
corresponding consequences since he came to office. The crisis eventually plunged the gap 
between the Oromo political elites and threatened the country's peace and economic survival. 
The political turmoil is increasing and there is almost a threat to the rule of law in the country.  
Furthermore, according to the Aigaforum the OLF which has been called for 
reconciliation and peaceful settlement of the conflict on the 19th of June 2018 speech made by 
the prime minister, also found the opportunity to destroy a government’s structure and tried 
to govern a few sub-cities in the western Oromia region. Similarly, according to the 
Continental Telegraph, FanaBroadcasting Corporate and Reuters news reports on the 15th, 
16thand 17thof January 2019respectively, listed on their websites that about 18 private- and 
government-owned banks in three Oromia zones were robbed and according to the 
rumours OLF was behind the robbery.64A few of the ODP members become divided against 
themselves and unwilling to cooperate with their party instead support OLF and the group of 
extremists in the Oromo region.65Consequently, the Aigaforum noted that the ODP, which 
has tried to slay this issue, has failed and some clashes between the ODP and the OLF also 
occurred. The Aigaforum mentioned, concerned Oromo elders, Abba Gadas, intellectuals, and 
business persons travelled to Wellega to investigate the matter and tried to bring both 
belligerent parties together. Similarly, Abiy accused the OLF of daydreaming to take his 
government power by force within three months.  
The study analysed that the fearless attitude of Abiy is likely to result in fierce 
competition among Oromo extremists and other political parties. This is a devastating event 
for the country. The ruling party and the federal government have yet to provide a road map 
showing the political and economic agenda. This is because, in the absence of any visible or 
feasible plans and an organised policy to promote the country’s economic situation, 
unemployment becomes a major source of political instability and can readily turn into a 
major threat to socio-economic stability across the country. Currently, Abiy’s administration 
is facing inevitable critics and opposition from societies, political elites, opposition parties, 
economists and extremists due to its fearlessness. However, it needs strong and strategic 





There have been many comments about the challenges that Abiy may face since 
coming to power, and many have speculated that handling of a coalition entailing ethnic 
groups with ideological differences can be one of the huge challenges. As has been 
prophesized, one of the huge challenges is a tendency for disunity among Amhara (ADP) and 
Tigray (TPLF)parties. Nor did Abiy, either as the country’s prime minister or as the EPRDF 
chairman, attempt to approach the two parties. Similarly, the hegemonic conduct of ODP and 
its ethnical extremists having the intention of holding several higher political authorities is 
escalating. This will facilitate the decline of the movement of solidarity and poverty struggle 
in the country. 
Furthermore, droughts, poverty, political repression, vigilante attacks, rebels, internal 
displacement and forced government resettlement have driven Ethiopia’s external and 
internal migration until recently.66In 2019, the level of humanitarian need was expected to 
remain the same as in the previous year and the country has now over eight million people in 
need of humanitarian assistance.67 Let alone, as of the 17th of February 2019, the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs listed on its website that only in 
central Gondar of Amhara regional state over 45 000 internally displaced people were in need 
of urgent humanitarian assistance. Even on the 22nd of October 2019 as per the regions’ mass 
media agency due to low rainfall, a severe drought hit Wag Himrazone and north Wollo in 
Amhara regional state; about hundred thousands of citizens in these particular zones are in 
need of urgent humanitarian assistance. The prime minister recently said on an interview for 
the Financial Times that if he lifts at least 60 million people out of poverty, whether he liked 
it or not he will be internationally famous.60 Nevertheless, as yetAbiy’s administration has no 
clear economic policy roadmap to let millions out of the poverty circle. As of the 28th of July 
2018, the Ethiopian Reporter listed on its website that there had been no declassified 
economic policy in Abiy’s administration and solving the unemployment problem that puts 
the country into crises had not yet begun. Markedly, when unemployment results in poverty, 
it turns into an object of political bargaining. 
Incidentally, intending to strengthen regional peace cooperation has implications for 
both the security and economic stability of the East African countries. However, if there is no 
institutional basis for any kind of regional cooperation, it will never benefit Ethiopia. For 
instance, Ethiopia's peace agreement and diplomatic relations with Eritrea have not yet been 
established institutionally nor has it been publicised, and whether Eritreans and Ethiopians 





relations with neighbouring governments is essential for Ethiopia, national stability should 
come first. Thus, his administration has to contemplate the essence of its nations’ perception 
of national stability. If not, what is the national interest of Ethiopia on regional cooperation in 
the existence of internal instability? 
In fact, political and economic hardship for Ethiopia is basically an internal problem, 
not a regional problem. The problem that needs more attention is mainly the domestic 
political and economic solution as well as ensuring national peace. Unquestionably, the 
diplomatic peace and reconciliation achievements, as well as political and economic 
cooperation in the region, should primarily be based on the national interest of the country. 
Conclusion 
After Abiy came to power, many reforms have taken place. Regardless, there are many ways 
in which Abiy’s reform project could go wrong. On the one hand, the emerging issues on the 
economic, social and political affairs in Ethiopia. First, on the political front, the coalition 
parties have been involved in a power struggle, internal divisions among EPRDF members 
are high and ethnic politics (racial federalism) and language-based politics has 
intensified.29Additionally, the deep-rooted mistrust between the EPRDF members, under-
represented seats in the coalition parties, the recent ‘Medemer’68 principle and the idea of the 
‘Prosperity Party’ exacerbate the issue. The aim of changing the EPRDF into the united party 
called Prosperity Party was fiercely opposed by many politicians, scholars, observers, and 
civil society groups. Such a situation may put the country at great risk of spurring various 
conflicts. 
Second, from the social perspective, the problem of inter-ethnicity continues to affect 
the citizens of the country, religious institutes are in danger, population displacements are 
traceable to political instability and the people have become refugees in their own country. 
Third, on the economic front, it is believed that there is horizontal inequality among the nine 
administrative regions.30For instance, according to several scholars since the revolution, 
Tigray has experienced vast economic growth that directly helps to develop huge industries 
as well as infrastructural facilities in the region.69This asymmetric economic development 
and other corresponding issues have led to anti-government violence and social anger. 
On the other hand, a diplomatic issue, which is the unclear and mysterious relations 
between Addis Ababa and Asmara, is of socio-political concern. It remains a question to 





Eritrean and Ethiopian citizens. As yet, their relationship is unclear to either of the societies 
as well as the international political arena, and the intentions of both societies are yet to be 
analysed. Moreover, Abiy’s administration has not been able to answer many of the concerns 
raised in the country. Some of the concerns raised made by members of civil society and 
critics include, whether his administration has the desire to resolve the structural and political 
problems facing the country. Whether it is wise for his administration to analyse the problem 
of the neighbouring countries instead of facing problems first in its own country? The 
question is not about why Abiy’s administration is paying more attention to solving the 
diplomatic confrontations and securing diplomatic achievements with the neighbouring 
countries but about whether his administration used enough time and effort to solve the 
internal problems. 
Ethiopia requires a leader who believes in a sturdy democratic government that 
provides the basic needs and freedom for the people. Abiy came to power during the most 
challenging moments of the country where there were conflicts and turbulences in several 
regions, the fear of persecution was mounting, the stability and living conditions of the 
capital were fragile, the capital city, Addis Ababa, was at risk, there was the increased 
difficulty of maintaining economic stability, uncertainties of peace prevailed in many regions, 
foreign currency scarcity was intensified, the reliability and righteousness of national 
statements made by the EPRDF regime were dubious, inter alia. 
Fortunately, Abiy’s journey bestows hope to the Ethiopian nation and beyond 
especially in the first half-year of his office. During his first year in office, he has been 
influential in all aspects of peace and development for the country as well as for neighbouring 
countries. Most importantly, his promising start in dealing with the peace agreement with 
Eritrea has the essential future of both nations with respect to several aspects. As a result, the 
2019 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to him. Nevertheless, lawlessness which is still 
prevalent in many parts of the country has been characterised by random ethnic conflicts, 
identity-based attacks and massive internal displacements. In general, the country is under the 
verge of political, economic, and social crises. As a result, some of his political moves have 
been judged as reckless and fearless. Thus, would Abiy continue onthe path of change in 
Ethiopia? This question remains a concern for most citizens in the country, scholars and 
policymakers. 
This study posits that there are two groups of thoughts in Ethiopia when it comes to 





a change of the constitution and abolition of ethnic-based regions and federalism, while 
others are ethnic nationalists who have been pushing the agenda of regional separation from 
the rest of the country. This is not the issue that can be undermined easily and need not 
reckless, sluggish and reluctant actions from the government; rather it requires vehement and 
rapid solutions for the sake of the future of the country. 
Incidentally, the leaders of the four ethnic parties and the opposition political parties 
should collaborate by eliminating their differences to establish lasting democracy, true peace, 
and unity in Ethiopia and beyond. This Prosperity Party has to bring forward something good 
to the country as well as to the societies that have not practiced during the EPRDF regime. 
Besides, it is the responsibility of every citizen to put in more effort to maintain genuine 
democracy, peace, and sustainable economic development in the country. If these discussed 
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